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Though Bankers Life is doubtful support for expanding rule 10b-
5 protection beyond the Birnbaum "purchaser-seller" limitation,
there is no Supreme Court decision which can be construed as a
mandate to keep it. The Eason court's new approach seems to be a
positive step toward adopting a more workable test than the narrow
"purchaser-seller" rule-a causal connection test, requiring that the
investor be injured as a direct consequence of a fraudulent securities
transaction. To assure that causation is direct rather than remote,
the investor must have participated in the transaction that alleg-
edly harmed him. Thus, by placing on the claimant the burden of
proof of direct causation, a court can maintain some control over the
amount of federal securities litigation, while allowing it to more
fully embrace the broad purposes of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.25
While the Seventh Circuit has left unanswered the precise definition
of "investors," it has made a constructive effort toward curing the
defects that were inherent in the "purchaser-seller" limitation.
Dennis K. Larry
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-NARCOTIC ADDICT REHA-
BILITATION ACT-The United States Supreme Court has held that a
provision of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, which excludes
narcotic addicts with two or more prior felony convictions from
consideration for civil commitment in lieu of penal incarceration,
does not violate the equal protection requirement of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
Robert Edward Marshall was sentenced to ten years in prison
28. As noted earlier, the Birnbaum decision stands, aside from the "purchaser-seller"
rule, for the proposition that section 10(b) was not directed at fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs, but at the type of fraud usually associated with the purchase or sale of
securities. Supra note 4. The Bankers Life decision largely rejected the Birnbaum proposi-
tion. It stated that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are not limited to protecting the integrity
of the securities markets, and that there is a federally enforceable claim by the purchaser
or seller for fraudulent mismanagement in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.
But Birnbaum still has vitality to the extent that transactions which constitute no more
than fraudulent mismanagement, unconnected with a purchase or sale of securities, are




after pleading guilty to a federal indictment charging him with en-
tering a bank with intent to commit a felcny. 1 He had petitioned the
district court for treatment as a narcotic addict pursuant to Title II
of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966.2 In lieu of incar-
ceration, Title II provides for civil commitment of eligible offenders
for narcotic addiction treatment after examination and recommen-
dation by both the Attorney General and trial judge.3 It further
provides for conditional release and supervision in the community
after a minimum commitment of six months.4 The district court
judge recommended narcotic addiction treatment during incarcera-
tion but denied petitioner's request for commitment under Title 11.5
He found that petitioner's three prior felony convictions brought
him within the Title II exclusionary provision which denies eligible
offender status to an addict with two or more prior felony convic-
tions.' Petitioner moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that
the two-prior-felony exclusion violates the constitutional guarantees
of equal protection required by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.7 The district court denied the motion to vacate the
sentence.8 The court of appeals affirmed,9 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 0 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the two-
prior-felony exclusionary provision constitutional."
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title II or the Act].
3. Id. §§ 4251-53.
4. Id. §§ 4254-55.
5. Marshall v. United States, No. C-71 1985 (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 1972).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 4251(f) (4) (1970) provides:
(f) "Eligible offender" means any individual who is convicted of an offense against
the United States, but does not include- . . . .
(4) an offender who has been convicted of a felony on two or more prior occa-
sions.
7. 414 U.S. at 420. Although the fifth amendment does not have an equal protection
clause, the concept of equal protection is implied from the fifth amendment due process
clause. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
8. Marshall v. United States, No. C-71 1985 (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 1972).
9. Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1972).
10. Marshall v. United States, 410 U.S. 954 (1973). The Court's reason for granting cer-
tiorari was two-fold: first, to consider petitioner's claim of unconstitutionality; second, to
resolve a conflict among the circuit courts regarding the constitutionality of the exclusionary
provision. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 418 (1974). For decisions upholding the
constitutionality of the provision see Marshall v, Parker, 470 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1972); Macias
v. United States, 464 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir. 1972). But see United States v. Bishop, 469 F.2d
1337 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Hamilton, 462 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Watson v.
United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
11. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 430 (1974).
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The Warren Court's extensive use of the equal protection doctrine
produced the well-known two-tiered approach for the examination
of legislative classifications attacked as denying equal protection.
Under this doctrine, the Court applied strict scrutiny when the
classifications involved were "suspect" or when they affected "fun-
damental interests."" The application of strict scrutiny reversed the
ordinary presumption of validity and required the government to
show that the legislation was a necessary means of achieving a legit-
imate governmental purpose.'" When statutes did not affect "sus-
pect classifications" or "fundamental interests" the Court applied
the rational basis test." This type of examination searched for any
perceivable rationale behind the legislative enactment and upheld
the legislation if any rational basis existed.' 5 The dichotomy was a
rigid one in which strict scrutiny almost assuredly meant interven-
tion, while application of the rational basis test consistently led to
deference in favor of the legislature.'" The Burger Court,
discontented with the rigid two-tiered approach, apparently devel-
oped a "middle-of-the-road" approach to equal protection prob-
lems." This method of examination limited the list of "suspect clas-
sifications" and "fundamental interests" to those well-founded in
precedent and concurrently expanded the rational basis test into a
more stringent and meaningful standard requiring legislative means
12. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1124-31 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. "Suspect classifications" include classifications based
on race and classifications similarly dealt with, such as national ancestry and alienage. See,
e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (national ancestry). This concept was developed in the late nineteenth century and
was based upon the reasoning that the central purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to
eliminate invidious racial discrimination. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). In contrast, the concept of "fundamental interests" was a recent development and
was apparently first used in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(procreation). It is in this area that the Warren Court extensively expanded the use of strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(criminal procedure).
13. Developments, supra note 12, at 1101, citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
14. Developments, supra note 12, at 1076-87.
15. Id. at 1074. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
16. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
17. Id. at 10-20.
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Recent Decisions
to substantially further legislative ends. 8 In other words, the Court
looked to the practical effects of the statute's application and com-
pared these effects to the purposes sought to be achieved." Marshall
v. United States" is an indication of the present position of the
Court in the equal protection area.
The majority decision in Marshall raises serious doubt as to the
Court's willingness to consistently apply the "middle-of-the-road"
equal protection standard to legislative classifications. The reasons
for this doubt are twofold. First, the method of applying the equal
protection standard in Marshall was substantially different from the
method employed in the "middle-of-the-road" equal protection
cases. Second, the Court ignored the irrebuttable presumption
problem which the case presents. The majority in Marshall merely
identified possible congressional purposes and failed to deal with
the question of whether these purposes are actually furthered by the
exclusionary provision and its practical effects. This deficiency in
the majority opinion leads to the conclusion that the Court is revert-
ing to the traditional "rational basis" test in its examination of
legislative classifications.
Mr. Justice Burger, in delivering the majority opinion, stated that
the concept of equal protection as embodied in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment requires that there be some "rational
basis" for the statutory distinction, or that it have some "relevance
to the purpose" for which it was made.2' After examining the Act
18. Id. at 17-36.
19. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); James
v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). The Moreno case is
an excellent example of the "middle-of-the-road" equal protection approach. At issue was a
provision of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 which excluded from the food stamp program any
household containing an individual who was unrelated to any other household member. The
Court, determining that the purpose of the Act was to safeguard the health and well-being
of the nation's population and to raise levels of nutrition among low income households, found
that the classification was "wholly without any rational basis." 413 U.S. at 533-38. To reach
this conclusion, the Court rejected the government's argument that the classification should
be upheld as rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmental interest in minimizing
fraud in the program. The Court reasoned that the Act contained provisions aimed specifi-
cally at the problem of fraud, thus providing an alternative to the presumption. Further, the
Court looked specifically to the effects of the classification and determined that "in practical
effect" the classification does not operate to rationally further the prevention of fraud. Id. at
535-37.
20. 414 U.S. 417.
21. Id. at 422, citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); James v. Strange, 407
U.S. 128 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
1974
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and its legislative history to find the congressional purpose, he con-
cluded: that the overall reason for the Narcotic Addict Rehabili-
tation Act was a congressional belief that some relationship existed
between drug addiction and crime; that Congress had further deter-
mined that a rehabilitative approach, rather than the traditional
penal approach, was necessary;22 that this purpose, however, was
not to make every addict eligible for civil commitment; and that the
exclusionary provision was meant to exclude those narcotic addicts
less likely to be rehabilitated and those whose records disclose a
history of serious crimes.13 The Court stated the issue as whether
Congress could rationally assume that an addict with two or more
felony convictions is less likely to be susceptible to rehabilitation by
reason of his past record and thus pose a greater threat to society
upon release. The Chief Justice identified three reasons" stemming
from the experimental nature of the program 5 on which Congress
could rationally have based the exclusionary provision:
1) congressional concern with the "susceptibility and suitabil-
ity" of multiple offenders to rehabilitative treatment;
2) concern that persons with records of two prior felonies might
(1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
In Boiling, a District of Columbia school desegregation case, the Court held that, although
the fifth amendment did not contain an equal protection clause, due process and equal
protection stem from the American ideal of fairness, and the two are not mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, it would be unthinkable that the Constitution would impose a lesser duty on
the federal government than on the states.
22. 414 U.S. at 423, citing H.R. REP. No. 1486, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966); S. REP. No.
1667, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
23. 414 U.S. at 424-25, citing H.R. REP. No. 1486, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1966); S.
REP. No. 1667, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966).
24. 414 U.S. at 425-29.
25. Justice Marshall rebutted the majority's argument that Title II is an experimental
program and that courts should be reluctant to interfere. He pointed out that the experimen-
tation involves peoples' lives and health and maintained that the program, now in its seventh
year, could no longer be considered experimental. Id. at 438. To read Marshall consistently
with other Burger Court "middle-of-the-road" cases, the majority and dissenting opinions can
be viewed as a factual disagreement over the experimental nature of the program. The
majority, finding the program experimental, would grant more leeway to the legislature in
dealing with sensitive problems. The dissent, viewing seven years as sufficient time in which
to experiment, would require stricter judicial intervention. The problem with this "factual"
analysis is that it would label as surplusage the major portion of the majority opinion, which
attempts to emphasize that the congressional purpose is rationally furthered. It seems likely,
therefore, that the majority did not rest its holding on this factual determination, but rather
that its view of the facts supported its more basic argument that the provision rationally
furthers the congressional purpose.
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be a threat to the successful treatment of others in the pro-
gram ;"5
3) the possible congressional concern that an addict with multi-
ple convictions would pose a greater potential harm to society
on early release than the addict who only had one or no prior
felony convictions.
The opinion concluded that the above were rational bases for the
classification without ever asking if multiple offenders are in fact
less susceptible to treatment, would jeopardize the treatment of
others, or would pose a threat to society upon early release.
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, concluded that even
under the rational basis test, the exclusion is a totally irrational
means toward the ends that Congress sought to achieve. 27 In con-
trast to the majority, he employed an intensified means-ends scru-
tiny-looking to the practical effects of the classification.
He identified three congressional purposes. The first was to give
treatment to those addicts whose criminal activity was only a prod-
uct of their addiction, while reserving strict criminal penalties for
hardened criminals. 8 The statute, however, does not achieve that
26. The Court's first two reasons stem from the nature of the treatment process-"an
arduous and delicate undertaking," requiring obedience and cooperation from the addict. S.
REP. No. 1667, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966). The medical and scientific uncertainties
Congress dealt with offer little basis for judicial response in absolute terms. Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Texas statute making intoxication in a public place a crime upheld as
constitutional). Thus, the majority reasoned that legislative options must be broad, and
courts must be careful not to modify legislation when Congress acts in these problem areas.
That the statute does not work with mathematical nicety, and that Congress did not give
the trial judge all of the discretion it could have given, does not render the provision unconsti-
tutional. 414 U.S. at 425-28, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
27. Justice Marshall reiterated his disagreement with the Court's rigid two-tiered ap-
proach to equal protection issues. 414 U.S. at 431. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,519-
30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He stated that, although the Court does not expressly
endorse or reject this approach, except where the Court invokes strict scrutiny, the equal
protection clause has been all but emasculated. Although the case did not meet the tradi-
tional suspect classification category, Justice Marshall did not agree with the majority's
testing the statute by the same minimum standard of rationality as applied to the sale of
eyeglasses or the ownership of pharmacies. 414 U.S. at 431-33. Here a man is deprived of
treatment for his "disease" of narcotic addiction while others similarly situated are provided
treatment and given suspension of prison sentences.
28. 414 U.S. at 434, citing 112 CONG. REc. 11,813 (1966).
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end.2" It allows an addict whose criminal activity was unrelated to
narcotic addiction, but who later became addicted pending trial, to
benefit from Title II if he has had only one prior conviction. It
excludes an addict with two prior felony convictions, even when
both of those felonies were related to his own drug use.
The second purpose Congress sought to achieve was the restric-
tion of Title II treatment to those narcotics addicts who are likely
to be rehabilitated. The Act provides a method to determine this
likelihood by limiting the participants to those whom the Attorney
General determines are likely to be rehabilitated." Inconsistent
with the policy behind individualized determination is the irrebut-
table presumption that a defendant with two prior felony convic-
tions is unlikely to be rehabilitated. The use of irrebuttable pre-
sumptions, Justice Marshall pointed out, has been viewed unfavora-
bly by the Court in the past." Furthermore, the administrator of the
California Narcotics Treatment Program, on which Title II was
modeled, testified that persons with as many as four or five previous
convictions respond better to the program than some of the younger
persons treated earlier in their careers. 3
Justice Marshall identified the third congressional purpose be-
hind the exclusionary provision as a congressional desire to elimi-
nate from the program violent antisocial persons who would inter-
fere with the rehabilitation of others. But he again concluded the
Congress has used "a numerical test to achieve a qualitative result
for which it is manifestly unsuited." 4 The exclusionary provision
creates the anomaly whereby an addict with an attempted murder
conviction is qualified to participate, while one with two possession-
of-narcotics convictions is not.
The majority's complete disregard of the irrebuttable presump-
tion issue raised by the case further supports the conclusion that the
Court is reverting to the traditional rational basis test.3 5 The dissent
29. 414 U.S. at 435. Marshall states that it fails to achieve the end because "a numerical
test was used to achieve a qualitative result for which it was totally unsuited."
30. Id. at 435.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 4252 (1970).
32. 414 U.S. at 435. See text accompanying notes 35-40 infra for an examination of
irrebuttable presumptions.
33. 414 U.S. at 436.
34. Id. at 437.
35. The area of irrebuttable presumptions is confused by the Court's failure to clearly
identify its justification for the concept. Although the Court bases the concept on a due
Vol. 13: 366
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indicated that the exclusion is a conclusive and irrebuttable pre-
sumption that an addict with two or more prior felony convictions
is not a likely candidate for rehabilitation. Citing Vlandis v. Kline,3
Justice Marshall stated that "permanent irrebuttable presumptions
have long been disfavored. ' 37 This applies particularly where the
interest at stake is as important as personal liberty, 38 and where the
question to be answered requires individualized determination .3
In Vlandis, students of the University of Connecticut challenged
the constitutionality of a state statute which permanently and irre-
buttably classified them as non-residents for the purpose of deter-
mining tuition and fees. The Court concluded that the statute vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by creat-
ing a permanent and irrebuttable presumption, when the presump-
tion was not necessarily or universally true, and when the state had
"reasonable alternative means" of making the crucial determina-
tion.4 Why should the same standard not be applied in Marshall?
The exclusionary provision created a permanent irrebuttable pre-
sumption that narcotic addicts with two or more prior felony convic-
tions are less likely to be rehabilitated. The remedy which the Court
has used to cure an irrebuttable presumption is a hearing to deter-
mine the issue in dispute.4 In Marshall, the Act in question provides
process theory, the doctrine is used in an area traditionally linked to equal protection. A
possible explanation is that the Court has used the concept as a substitute for the "middle-
of-the-road" equal protection test. Under the irrebuttable presumption approach, the remedy
imposed is merely the addition of a hearing to the proceedure, while in the "middle-of-the-
road" approach, the result is a completely unconstitutional classification. The difference in
remedies allows the Court to apply a type of irrebuttable presumption/strict scrutiny with
an effect even milder than the "middle-of-the-road" equal protection test. But see Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HAv. L. REv. 1535, 1556 (1974),
for the proposition that the Court's use of the irrebuttable presumption concept is unfounded
in legal theory.
36. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
37. 414 U.S. at 435.
38. Although Mr. Justice Marshall feels that personal liberty is at stake, it should be
noted that, but for the statute, the defendant, who has already been convicted, would be
incarcerated.
39. 414 U.S. at 435. The determination of such issues in Marshall as the likelihood of
rehabilitation requires weighing many factors and necessitates an individualized determina-
tion. The desired result can not be accomplished by the application of a numerical test.
40. 412 U.S. at 452.
41. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). The Court held unconstitutional a statute
which permanently and irrebuttably presumed that all unmarried fathers were unqualified
to raise their children and, therefore, required that the state take custody of illegitimate
children upon the death of the mother. The Court required that a hearing be provided to
determine the father's parental fitness.
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for a determination by the Court of the defendant's potential for
rehabilitation-the precise remedy required by the irrebuttable pre-
sumption cases. Yet the Court fails to give this provision its proper
effect and instead upholds the presumption.
The majority opinion, by its failure to apply an intensified means-
ends examination and by its failure to discuss irrebuttable pre-
sumptions, indicates the Court's inconsistency in applying the
"middle-of-the-road" equal protection standard and its willingness
to revert to the traditional "rational basis" test.
Henry Chajet
TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-IMPLIED CONTRACTS-TRUTH IN
LENDING-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that
mortgagors, alleging the misuse of escrow funds by mortgagees,
stated a cause of action for breach of an express trust, for imposition
of a constructive trust, and for breach of an implied contract, but
that the allegations, if proven, would not violate the Truth in Lend-
ing Act.
Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings & Loan Association, 320
A.2d 117 (Pa. 1974).
Plaintiffs, mortgagors, filed a class action suit in the Common
Pleas court of Allegheny County' against the defendants, their mort-
gagees, and the Federal National Mortgage Association.' Plaintiffs
sought to force defendants to discontinue the practice of commin-
gling mortgage escrow funds3 with defendants general funds and
1. Allegheny County is one of the four counties in the Pittsburgh, Pa. Standard Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area.
2. At the time of the trial court's ruling, defendants consisted of fourteen federally-
chartered and thirteen state-chartered savings and loan associations, four national banks,
and one savings bank. Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 P.L.J. 247 (C.P.
Allegh. Co. 1974).
3. Monthly tax and insurance payments are either held in escrow or capitalized. Under
the former method, used by most mortgage lenders, mortgage payments are credited to three
separately maintained accounts-principal, interest, and escrow. When taxes and insurance
premiums are paid, the escrow account is debited and any remaining balance carried forward.
Since taxes (in Allegheny County) and insurance premiums are paid annually, the lender has
some portion of the funds available to him for all or part of the year. Escrow funds are "freely
commingled with the mortgagee's general funds and used to earn income." 320 A.2d at 121-
22 (footnote omitted).
